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Abstract: Criminal trial hearings are communicative events that are densely intertextually 
structured. In the course of a trial hearing, written documents such as police records of 
statements made by suspects, witnesses and experts are extensively referred to, quoted, 
paraphrased, summarized and recontextualized. In fact, such drawing upon the (written 
documents in) the case file is inevitable, as demonstrating (or invalidating) the defendant’s 
criminal liability crucially depends on the transformation of discourses produced at previous 
stages of the trial into lawful evidence. Detailed analyses of the various discursive processes 
through which intertextual links with the case file are established are thus essential for 
understanding exactly how trial participants negotiate versions of events with specific legal 
implications. In this special issue we bring together a collection papers that deal with such 
intertextual practices in different legal settings. 
 
 
1. Intertextuality in the legal process 
The intertextual practices that connect a trial hearing to the various discourses produced 
in preparation for the trial are complex and multilayered. A first complicating element is the 
fact that the institutional aims of the various legal actors are not the same. Different 
participants at the trial will establish differing intertextual connections depending on their 
professional role. Prosecutors aim to demonstrate the defendant’s liability while lawyers aim 
to minimize it; judges have their own specific role in establishing “the truth”, depending on 
the legal system in question. Second, there is the fact that criminal hearings do not come out 
of the blue; rather, they represent one step in a bureaucratically organized chain of events. 
This, too, has its impact on the specific form quoting practices in the courtroom take. 
 This last point deserves some further clarification. Criminal adjudication can be 
characterized as a process of gradual discursive transformation: Throughout the successive 
stages of the trial (e.g. investigation by the police, the prosecutor’s decision to take the case 
to court, the hearing), professional legal actors are working together (or, depending on the 
specific stage, against one another) to assign the “facts” which the defendant is tried for 
(situated conduct that is inextricably tied to the specifics of the setting in which the facts were 
committed and is thus deeply “local”) to one of the abstract categories of criminal law 
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(Matoesian, 2001; Dupret, 2011; see also Maynard and Wilson, 1980). The trial hearing 
represents a crucial stage in this gradual transformation, because the proposed legal 
categorization of the defendant’s conduct becomes a binding legal reality only after the 
defendant has the opportunity to publicly defend him/herself against the accusation (and after 
the applicability of the relevant category of criminal law has been endorsed by the judge in 
the verdict).  
The above already affords us a first glimpse of the complexity of the network of 
intertextual relationships that are played out in the courtroom by the various participants. On 
the one hand, demonstrating (or invalidating) criminal liability always involves a form of 
reconstruction of the facts of the case, including the defendant’s linguistic conduct at the time 
of the facts. In this sense, the relationship between the hearing and the facts that are being 
discussed very much resembles the classic distinction between reporting and reported event: 
the hearing is a discursive arena where remote speech events are recounted. 
 On the other hand, however, deciding the applicability of the proposed legal category 
would be impossible without the written records that contain an officially certified version of 
the facts of the case. These documents consist primarily of police records of statements by 
suspects, witnesses and experts, and are collected in the case file. These are the discourses 
produced in preparation for the trial which are extensively referred to, quoted, paraphrased, 
summarized or otherwise recontextualized in the course of the trial (in order to be accepted 
by the court as lawful evidence). This obviously complicates the relationship between the 
reporting and reported event postulated earlier: In reporting what the defendant allegedly said 
or did in the course of the incident for which he or she has to stand trial, the prosecutor, 
defense attorneys and other trial participants are not directly quoting the reported event itself, 
but are instead relying on third parties’ reports of that event.  
Importantly, these third-party reports that are cited in the course of the hearing have a life 
of their own, a “natural history of discourse” (Silverstein and Urban, 1996) that accrues as 
they move from one context to another in the progression of the trial. In this sense, these texts 
indeed “travel,” as the title of a recent edited volume (Heffer et al., 2013) suggests: They 
gradually proceed through the successive contexts (interrogation, compiling the indictment, 
the trial hearing, the verdict) which together make up the textual “trajectory” (Blommaert, 
2005) characteristic of criminal adjudication. However, the notion of texts as entities 
“travelling” through the legal space ought also to be taken with a grain of salt. Earlier 
research extensively demonstrated the illusory character of the idea that documents moving 
along the legal chain are stable objects that have a fixed character. The assumption that a 
document quoted in court is a stable entity “hides the diachronic instability of the discourse 
from which text emerged” (Rock et al., 2013: 3). Throughout the various nodes of the legal-
bureaucratic trajectory of a text, discourses are continually appropriated by new legal actors 
who subject them to “de-“ and “recontextualization” (Bauman and Briggs, 1991), as they 
insert these discourses in their new textual environment—a process that goes hand in hand 
with subtle transformations that may nevertheless have strong legal consequences and that 
are open to strategic manipulation (for some particularly vivid examples, consider Matoesian, 
2001; Ehrlich, 2007; Haket, 2007). 
The current special issue further elaborates this dual theme—the hearing as an 
intertextual event, that is in turn part of an ongoing process of textual transformation. It 
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brings together a number of papers that all deal with quoting and associated intertextual 
practices as they come about in legal settings. Some of them were presented at the panel 
“Quoting from the case file” organized at the XIth IPrA conference in Manchester (3-8 July, 
2011), while others originated in the context of the research project “Intertextuality in judicial 
settings” at the VU University in Amsterdam, the Netherlands (NWO project number 360-70-
240). Together, the different papers offer a broad picture of quoting practices in various legal 
settings, spanning different countries with diverse legal systems. They also document 
different key moments within the course of the criminal trial, which draws further attention to 
the bureaucratic requirements and contextual contingencies by which reporting practices are 
shaped. 
 
2. Different legal settings 
In this special issue we have aimed to bring together papers that analyze intertextual 
practices in different legal settings and different legal systems. There is one paper, by Van 
Charldorp, that focuses on the very beginnings of the intertextual chain. While the other 
contributions describe how quoting and associated intertextual practices transform written 
text into talk, van Charldorp’s takes exactly the opposite route.  Her analyses of police 
interrogations of petty crime suspects document how the officers in charge of the 
interrogation transform talk into written documents, which will later be used as evidence in 
court. Her paper describes the context in which the documents are produced that the quoting 
parties later rely on in court, and as such it forms an essential counterpart to the other papers 
that analyze how these documents are quoted higher up in the chain.   
The other authors who contributed to this issue specifically address the discursive 
processes by which interactions on prior occasions are imported into the discourse of 
courtrooms, although in different legal settings. One contribution documents a particularly 
vivid instance of intertextuality in an adversarial setting. Johnson’s paper draws its data from 
the much publicized Harold Shipman trial, which lasted 51 days and resulted in the 
conviction of the British general practitioner on the count of the assassination of fifteen 
patients. In her analysis, she documents how the judge, at the end of the trial, summarizes the 
evidence for the jury; in doing so, he juxtaposes oral testimony that was presented to the 
court in the course of the hearing with reenactments in court of transcripts of police 
interviews.  
The papers by Van der Houwen and Sneijder, Maryns, and D’hondt document practices 
of quoting in a continental, mixed inquisitorial-adversarial legal system (the Netherlands and 
Belgium, respectively). Van der Houwen and Sneijder, and also D’hondt, present data from 
courts where criminal cases are adjudicated by professional judges, where there are only 
sporadic in person examination of witnesses in court, and the judge, prosecutor, attorney and 
other professional trial participants rely almost exclusively on written documents produced 
prior to the hearing, in the course of the criminal investigation. Maryns’ paper, however, 
describes the intertextual construction of insanity in a murder case that appeared before a 
Belgian Assize Court trial. Here, the entire investigation is orally reenacted before the eyes of 
the jury. 
Licoppe’s contribution stands apart, as his paper tackles a legal setting that is strictly 
speaking not a trial and represents a recent innovation in the French legal system: “future 
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dangerousness assessment hearings” in which a panel of experts, presided over by a judge, 
must determine whether an inmate who committed a violent crime poses a risk of recidivism 
or whether he or she should be allowed to return to society. Consequently, the documents that 
participants in these hearings quote from are not police reports, but expert testimony that was 
commissioned by the committee responsible for these assessments. The hearings are 
additionally complicated by the fact that inmates are usually not physically present. Instead, 
he or she participates in the hearing through a video link. 
 
3. Different methodological commitments 
Four of the six papers in this issue (Licoppe, Van der Houwen and Sneijder, Van 
Charldorp, and D’hondt) subscribe to the analytical concerns and methodological 
commitments of ethnomethodological conversation analysis (CA)—even though they 
occasionally also borrow concepts such as footing and narrative from authors like Goffman 
and Labov if these turns out useful for elucidating participants’ practices. The paper by Van 
der Houwen and Sneijder takes a conversation analytical approach to analyze the interaction 
between the judge and suspect but also draws upon insights from discursive psychology (e.g. 
Edwards and Potter, 1992) to analyze the statements by the prosecutor and lawyer. 
What these authors have in common is that they approach the textual chain as something 
that is formulated, at least partially, within the talk itself, much in line with the classic CA 
position on issues of context (see, e.g., Schegloff 1992). Thus, Licoppe, Van der Houwen and 
Sneijder, and D’hondt describe how participants in a hearing, in quoting from the case file, 
reflexively connect that hearing to a particular, pre-existent legal-bureaucratic textual 
trajectory. In the very act of doing so, the participants inevitably present a specific version of 
that trajectory, as their quoting is based on, and hence “makes public,” a particular 
interpretation of how that case is based on a variety of written documents. A similar 
observation can be made regarding Van Charldorp’s discussion of how talk is transformed 
into text in police interrogations, which focuses on the very beginning of the intertextual 
chain. Her paper demonstrates that assembling a written report is not something that happens 
post factum, but is very much a matter of relevant concern in the face-to-face organization of 
the interview itself. Here as well, then, the intertextual chain features as an object of attention  
already “within” the interaction. 
 The papers by Johnson and Maryns approach reporting practices from a slightly different 
angle. While Maryns adopts a broadly linguistic-anthropological perspective on what she 
calls “interdiscursivity” (which, in addition to explicit intertextual linkages, also includes 
more implicit correlations between discourses), Johnson’s contribution is the one that stands 
methodologically most apart. Her paper illustrates what Partington et al. (2013) refer to as a 
Computer-Assisted Discourse Studies approach (CADS), which involves the back-and-forth 
tracking between (1) distributional observations on the lexical items selected by the judge for 
organizing and introducing his references to the oral testimony produced during the forty trial 
days that preceded and (2) in-depth analyses of selected discourse fragments.  
 
4. Intertextual practices: Trends and themes 
 In the remainder of this introduction, we try to unravel some of the themes that are 
recurrent throughout the various contributions to this special issue. 
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4.1. The variety of intertextual practices (and their context-dependency) 
At one level we can distinguish three types of intertextual practices, as relevant to the 
legal settings analyzed in this special issue: 1) reporting practices that go from talk to text, as 
is exemplified in the paper by Van Charldorp, 2) reporting practices that go from text to talk, 
as is exemplified in various of the other papers, and 3) reporting practices that go from talk to 
talk, which can be found, for example, in the analyses of jury trials by Johnson and Maryns. 
 At another level we can distinguish, regardless of the “direction” of the reporting (talk-
text, text-talk, talk-talk, text-text), between direct and indirect reported speech. The main 
difference between these two reporting strategies lies in their deictic orientation. Direct 
reported speech retains the deictic center of the original utterance: The latter preserves its 
original deictics and the quoted discourse thus firmly anchors itself in the reported event (e.g. 
the police station, or the event for which a suspect has been arrested). For indirect reported 
speech, however, it is the reporting event (for instance, the courtroom) that becomes the 
deictic center of the quoted utterance (and deictic forms of that utterance shift accordingly, 
such that 1
st
 sing. I becomes 3
rd
 sing. she or he, etc). The contrast between the two, then, lies 
in the fact that for direct reported speech, the reported event is “drawn into” the reporting 
event. In legal contexts, direct reported speech has been found to foreground the information 
it reports (Philips, 1986; Van der Houwen, in press; see also Johnson, this issue).  
There are good reasons to assume, however, that the choices language users face in 
choosing a particular strategy are more complex than this binary distinction suggests. Thus, 
in the literature there is a longstanding discussion over a “third option”, variously referred to 
as “free indirect” or “represented speech” (see, e.g., the discussion in Coulmas, 1986, p.6ff). 
It might be more fruitful, therefore, to think of reporting strategies as comprising a scale, 
ranging from more indirect ones such as summarizing, paraphrasing, and indirect reporting, 
to more direct ones such as direct reported speech with verbum dicendum and without, 
resulting in reenacted direct reported speech. Many of the papers in this issue also point in 
this direction, as they strongly emphasize the local specificity and local variety of reporting 
practices. They show how the intertextual connections that are forged with prior discourses 
are sensitive to the specific institutional character of the legal setting, and document in detail 
how these connections exploit the interactional opportunities which the specific “node” of the 
legal chain that is being investigated offers to the quoting agents. For obvious reasons, the 
resulting picture of reporting practices resists reduction to simple binary schemata. Thus, 
Johnson, in a discussion of how the judge makes use of the contrastive use of different forms 
of reported speech for organizing his summary of the evidence for the jury, throws in an until 
now undocumented third option which she characterizes as the “re-enactment” of entire 
question-answer sequences. In an entirely different setting (French “dangerousness 
assessment hearings”), Licoppe distinguishes two different strategies that judges routinely 
choose between for referring to written expert testimony collected in the file before them: 
“indirect reported text” (in which “written claims about the defendant are conveyed through 
the voice of other parties”, p. TO BE SUPPLIED LATER) and “text as addressed speech” (in 
which written claims are re-enacted as explicit assessments of the inmate appearing in front 
of them). D’hondt’s analyses of footing shifts in the closing statement by a defense attorney 
in a Belgian first-instance court also presents a more subtle and more context-sensitive ways 
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of embedding courtroom discourse in the chain of discourses that preceded it. A similar 
observation can be made for Maryns account of interdiscursivity in Belgian jury trials. 
 
4.2. The presumed invisibility of reporting agents 
It has repeatedly been observed that the subsequent de- and recontextualizations to which 
texts are subjected as they travel up and down along the textual chain, and the mediating 
agents that are responsible for these successive interpretative operations, remain largely 
unnoticed. Other research has shown, both in adversarial (e.g., Matoesian, 2001; Ehrlich 
2007) and inquisitorial legal systems (e.g., Sneijder 2011, Van der Houwen 2013), that the 
prevailing “referentialist” linguistic ideology (which holds that the meaning of quoted 
discourse exclusively resides “inside the words” of the quoted text) entirely draws out of 
sight the strategic recontextualizations which this text is subject to as it is incorporated in the 
speaker’s new discourse. Direct reported speech, in which the speaker at first sight merely 
“animates” (Goffman 1981) what another speaker presumably said, thus allows legal actors 
to subtly fuse the quoted discourse with their own voice—which is why it constitutes such a 
powerful rhetorical device. According to Matoesian (2001), reported speech “shapes 
testimony” as it transforms prior utterances into evidence and imbues them with affective 
meaning, in this process naturalizing discursive authority and attributing social identities to 
the trial participants. Reported speech and related intertextual practices therefore constitute 
“the evidential infrastructure of the adversarial system of justice” (2001: 105). 
The contributions to this issue demonstrate that cross-examination and the presentation of 
the evidence in court (described, for example, in Matoesian’s work) are not the sole stages in 
the chain where the agency of the reporting agents (and the mediating role other agencies that 
transmitted the discourse at earlier stages in the textual chain) is downplayed and rendered 
invisible. In those legal systems that do not allow for the tape recording of interrogations, for 
example, reporting officers routinely produce monologized version of dialogical interaction 
that nevertheless present themselves as if they are a faithful rendition of what the defendant 
said (Komter, 2013), which are subsequently treated as such by actors higher up in the legal 
chain (Komter, 2013; Maryns, 2013).  
The papers by van Charldorp (on police interrogations), and by Van der Houwen and 
Sneijder, Maryns, and Johnson (on courtroom talk) further elaborate this theme. Whereas 
previous research focused on the invisible agency of the textual mediator in adversarial legal 
systems, the papers by Van der Houwen and Sneijder, Maryns, and Johnson demonstrate 
such agency to be also at work in inquisitorial legal systems (Van der Houwen en Sneijder, 
Maryns) and in those stages of the adversarial trial where textual mediation is supposed to be 
neutral (Johnson). 
Thus, Johnson’s paper on the Shipman trial presents a vivid picture of the way in which 
the judge, in “summarizing” the evidence for the jury, constructs a powerful “polyphonic 
monologue” that leaves jury members no other option than to find the defendant guilty. The 
contribution by Van der Houwen and Sneijder highlights the selectivity of the reporting 
agents, as each party quotes those voices that support their own version of what happened. 
Maryns describes how interdiscursivity allows a defense attorney to renegotiate the meaning 
of a category of criminal law, in this case insanity, which is undefined from a legal 
perspective. Van Charldorp, finally, approaches the issue from a slightly different angle. Her 
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paper documents the various formats which a police interrogation of the suspect of a minor 
offense may take, the bottom line being that the written records of these interrogations fail to 
do justice to the interactive, highly dialogical contexts in which they came about. Here, the 
mediating agency that is rendered invisible is not the courtroom participant who quotes the 
written report, but the police officer who put the report together.  
 
4.3. The intertextual trajectory as interactional resource 
Quoting thus generally proceeds under the assumption of textual stability across contexts, 
yet some contributors proceed in a direction that suggests precisely the opposite. Their work 
raises the possibility that the invisibility of mediating agencies in compiling records of what 
happened might somehow be less absolute than the above suggests. It proposes that this 
invisibility is a matter of degree that is contextually variable, and that it is very much a matter 
of strategic choice whether or not to act upon a piece of text as if it were a literal rendition of 
what someone else said. Participants to a hearing may, to the contrary, also draw attention to 
the particular circumstances under which the text was produced and to the subsequent 
recontextualizations to which it was subjected (for example, by “animating” it in a way that 
suggests insincerity on the part of the party who drafted the record). They hence exhibit, in 
the very details of their intertextual practices and in the way they quote other parties’ talk, an 
acute reflexive awareness of the textual trajectory the quoted materials go through and of the 
fact that they “passed through many hands”, each of which entails an opportunity for strategic 
manipulation. In this sense, the intertextual trajectory of the quoted text becomes an 
interactional resource. 
Licoppe, for example, in his discussion of the way judges use “indirect-reported-text” in 
the initial summaries of expert testimony they produce at the start of dangerousness 
assessment hearings, demonstrates how “differences in the choice of reporting agency […] 
reflects the length of the chain of mediations involved in the production and the spoken re-
enactment of the file” (p. TO BE SUPPLIED LATER). Through the choice of the specific 
formulation by which the reported text is introduced, judges may either draw attention to the 
expert who authored the report of the inmate’s examination, or to their own reading of the 
report. Alternatively, he or she may also decide to treat the examination of the defendant as 
just another speech event (e.g., in which he or she voiced a particular opinion), thus leaving 
the chain of mediations out of the picture altogether. Thus, “within the frame of indirect 
reported text, the variety of ways in which the president refers to the file during his initial 
summary makes relevant in different ways the network of mediations, agencies and language 
activities that link the initial interviews with various professionals and the current context of 
his spoken reference, and which the file documents” (ibid.). 
D’hondt’s analysis of footing patterns in a not-guilty plea further elaborates this theme. 
Different segments of the plea project different phenomenal fields. They can be 
distinguished, for example, on the basis of whether the defense attorney emerges as an 
independent character in the discourse (who produces an “impartial” assessment of the 
accusation) or whether he or she presents him/herself as merely “animating” the client’s 
voice. Furthermore, the way the client-attorney relationship is enacted through footing cannot 
be separated from the wider participation frameworks which the plea projects (the role it 
attributes to the judge, the prosecutor, the audience, etc.) and from the particular perspective 
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on the legal-bureaucratic textual trajectory that it puts forward. Footing patterns can thus 
additionally be distinguished on the basis of whether they background the case file (e.g., 
when the attorney merely “relays” the client’s position) or whether the case file emerges as 
an explicit object of attention (e.g., when he or she “enters into a dialogue” with a police 
statement). In those segments where the attorney enters into a dialogue with the case file, 
direct quotes from the police record often serve the function of drawing attention to the 
particular circumstances under which the case against the client was put together. They 
maximize the distance between reported and reporting event, suggesting that the written 
record (the “mediating step” between reporting and reported event) was manipulated by the 
arresting officers with an eye on its later use in court.  
Like in the papers that we discussed in 4.2, however, this use of direct reported speech to 
underscore the insincerity of the quoted discourse is still based on the ideology that the 
attorney’s quote constitutes a faithful rendition of the written record that is being referred to. 
It may thus well be possible to highlight the mediating agency of other actors in the legal 
chain (in the case of instances of direct-reported-text discussed by Licoppe) or to openly 
challenge the validity of the mediating textual link (in D’hondt’s case), but such explicit 
orientations to the textual trajectory of the quoted materials do itself not invalidate the 
“intertextual authority of reported speech” (Matoesian 2000: 879). 
Put next to one another, these papers draw attention to yet another manner in which the 
legal-bureaucratic character of legal settings affects the shape quoting in the courtroom may 
take. They highlight the possibility that intertextual practices may creatively exploit the 
intertextual distance between reporting and reporting event, and this constitutes an additional 
parameter on which various practices of quoting can be differentiated. 
 
4.4. The multiple involvements of the reporting agent 
Another element that further complicates quoting practices in courtrooms, partially related to 
the previous point, is the fact that the setting in which such quoting takes place is usually a lot 
more complex than the protocols for courtroom hearings suggests. It is by now commonplace 
that quoting must be analyzed in terms of the pragmatics of the local speech situation and the 
way it contributes to the interactional unfolding of the reporting event (for a specifically 
conversation-analytic version of this claim, see the various contributions in Holt and Clift, 
2007). In the various legal settings documented in this issue, this argument assumes a 
particular twist precisely because of the fact that quoting and related intertextual practices are 
specifically attuned to the equivocality of the participation frameworks courtroom 
participants operate and the fact that they are somehow less stable than the bureaucratic 
character of the setting suggests. That is, legal actors, and also the lay participants with whom 
they interact, often find themselves aligned towards one another on the basis of participation 
frameworks that are highly equivocal, as these frameworks position the participants vis-à-vis 
one another on the basis of multiple involvements. 
Licoppe’s distinction between indirect-reported-text and text-as-addressed-speech, for 
example, must be seen in the light of the highly “reflexive” character of the case summaries 
that judges produce at the start of dangerousness assessment hearings. Reflexivity here refers 
to the dual status of the inmate appearing before the commission, i.e., the fact that he or she is 
at once the object of the written expert assessments re-enacted by the judge and the recipient 
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of these reenactments. Indirect-reported-text and text-as-addressed-speech, then, represent 
different ways of attending to this tension. From a slightly different angle, D’hondt’s analysis 
of footing shifts in a not guilty plea demonstrates that attorneys creatively exploit the mixed 
inquisitorial-accusatorial nature of Belgian criminal hearings as maneuvering space for 
continually readjusting their relationship to the client and the other courtroom participants. 
The paper by Van Charldorp teaches us that this multiplicity of involvements in which the 
reporting agent is entangled is not restricted to courtroom hearings hearing, but is also 
characteristic of other stages in the textual chain. Police officers who interrogate a suspect, 
for example, must continually juggle between keeping the interaction going with a co-
participant whose prime concern is to demonstrate the ordinariness of his or her conduct and 
writing a document (the suspect’s statement) that meets the procedural requirements of 
lawful evidence. 
Maryns’ paper, finally, addresses a topic that since Conley and O’Barr’s (1990) seminal 
work has become a recurrent theme in studies of language and the law: the lingering conflict 
between professional and lay perspectives on what is going on inside the courtroom. Her 
analysis of a defense lawyer’s intertextual strategies for negotiating the meaning of a legal 
concept (and imbuing it with a set of commonsense understandings) brings to light the 
intermediary role of legal actors in a jury trial, in particular the fact that they must continually 
navigates the tension between professional and everyday understandings of the legal process. 
 
Conclusion 
With this special issue we hope to have contributed to the further understanding of how 
texts in the legal process come about, how they are drawn upon by different legal 
professionals further along in the legal trajectory, so as to highlight the role they play in legal 
decision making. It is obviously a tricky exercise trying to summarize six different papers on 
the basis of four different themes that we believe to be recurrent. Therefore, we would like to 
invite the reader to explore for him- or herself how the various authors have attended to the 
issue of intertextuality in legal contexts. Together, the papers collected in this issue, in spite 
of the limitations that are inherent in having to make a selection between different settings 
and various legal systems, offer us at least a glimpse of the way intertextual practices shape 
legal discourse, each at the specific point in the textual chain that it addresses. 
To round of, we would like to point out that the intertextual practices documented here 
are not only interesting from a fundamental scientific perspective, but that they also have real 
world implications for those who are part of the justice process as either suspect or witness; 
implications that may not always be stated explicitly in the different papers, but which we 
would do well to share with those in the professional field that we study. 
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